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Bureaucratic Power and Instream Flows
BERTON L.

LAMB

Eastern Kentucky University
and
HARVEY

R.

DOERKSEN

Fish and Wfldlife Service
United States Department of the Interior
Water resource allocation encompasses two basic categories of water
use: diversionary and instream use. The diversionary use of waterfalls
under the rubric of development uses which have long been recognized
as 'beneficial" both in law and public opinion. Diversionary uses actually remove water from the stream for irrigation, domestic consumption, and industrial purposes.
Instream uses, on the other hand, have not historically been recognized as beneficial in state laws. Only recently has there been rising
concern for retaining water in the streams for maintenance of fish and
wildlife habitat, recreation, and aesthetic purposes. The concern for
instream uses reflects a growing interest in protecting a certain quality
of life. If we value as an important environmental goal the maintenance
of certain Hows within our natural rivers, then we must make certain,
in the immediate future, to guarantee a legal right for our citizens to
those instream Hows.
In some states even today, state laws permit total appropriation of
riverflows for out-of-stream uses. Oth er states are beginning to provide
legal protection for certain instream uses. Nevertheless, the traditional
legal principle of "first in time, first in right" generally allows only the
most junior right to instream Hows for fish and wildlife, recreation, and
aesthetic uses.
The potential for further protection of instream water rights exists
in the merging "Federal Reserved Rights" and the quantification of such
rights, but the impact of this trend is uncertain.
The concern of this paper is neither the legal developments nor the
ramifications of changes in the legal environment regarding protection
of instream Hows. Rather, the paper explores the political/ institutional
factors regarding instream-flow reservations which are a part of the
legal environment.
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The focus of this paper is on public agencies which have some responsibility for detem1ining instream-flow requirements. This is base d
on the belief that th e numerous agencies represent a microcosm of the
larg er political arena in water resources. Water politics for many years
have been dominated by political interest groups. Th ese groups identify
selectively with the governmental agencies representing various wa ter
development and water-use interests. Through the group process and
Congressional action, the agency's interests are broadly representative of
the historical societal interests regarding water use and management.
The new emphasis on a legal right to flowing streams for fish and
wildlife habitat, recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment is introduced
into a political environment which long has favored out-of-stream uses
of water for domestic use and economic gain . The extent to which the
new demands for instream uses prevail depends in part on legal developments and in part on the result of interagency bargaining. In this sense,
agency interrelationships truly represent a microcosm of the broader
political arena.
There are a wide range of agencies involved in instream-flow determinations. Most of these agencies have some more or less well-defined
statutory responsibility or mission orientation that justifies their activities
relative to instream-flow needs. The major state and federal agencies
in the Pacific Northwest with some involvement in determining instream:flow needs are shown in Table 1. The intent of this table is to provide
a general basis for identifying the legal or extra legal basis for each
agency's involvement and to specify the primary areas of concern relating to instream :flows. This table simply specifies a starting poin t
from which agencies justify involvement in one aspect of public policy
making . Thus , it represents the first step in analyzing the very complex
interrelationships among the many agencies.
The agencies are by no means equal with one another. They diller in
terms of relative influence, intensity of interest , statutory authority, behavioral roles, use orientations, and level of involvement. In short, the
agencies differ in their relative power vis-a-vis other agencies. The
extent to which the agencies diller in these regards may very well
influence substantially the extent to which instream :flows are recognize d
as a primary water use in an already competitive water allocation
environment.
The analysis of agency interactions presented herein is based on a
survey undertaken during the summer of 1974, funded by the Office of
Water Research and Technology of the D epartment of the Interior. The
authors were associated with the State of Washington Water Research
Center through which the study was coordinated. The findings are based,
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TABLE 1
Index of Agencies
Federal
Agency

Statute

Nature af
Authority

Substantive
Uses (Mission)

Federal Power
Commission

Federal Power
Act (PL 74-333,
49 Stat. 803, 838)

Licensing

Power, navigation

United States
Forest Service

Organic Act
1897, Weeks Act
1911

Land Management

Fish & Wildlife,
Water Quality,
Domestic Consumption, Aesthetics,
Recreation

Soil Conservation
Service

P.L.566

Study and
Recommend

Agriculture, diversion, irrigation,
drainage & flow
control

National Marine
Fisheries Service

Fish & Wildlife
Coordination Act
(16 USC 661
et seq.), Mitchell
Act (16 USC
755 et seq.)

Study and
Recommend

Anadromous Fish

Corps of
Engineers

Flood Control
Act of 1970; 16
use 460d; 33
use 540, 608;
16 use 661, 662

Navigation & Flood Navigation
Control, Construction & Management

Bureau of
Indian Affairs

The Reservation
Act

Land Management

Fish Habitat,
Agricultural &
Cultural Diversion

Bureau of Land
Management

The Wild &
Scenic River Act,
Clean Water
Restoration Act,
43 USCA 13611363

Land Management

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat, Agricultural
and Industrial
diversion

Geological
Survey

20 stat. 394,
43 use 31,
Federal Power
Act of 1720.
Survey Order 115
1925

Study and
Recommended

All Uses

National Parks
Service

16 USCA l; P.L.
88-577; P.L
90-542

Land Management

Hydroelectric
Power, Wildlife &
Fish Habitat,
Recreation

Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation

Federal Water
Project Recreation
Act (16 USCA
460 L-12 et seq . )

Study and
Recommend

Recreation,
Aesthetic
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Nature of
Authority

Physical Regulation

Substantive
Uses (iMisswn)

Bureau of
Reclamation

43 USCA 41/ff
and 16 USCA 40
L-19

Agricultural
Diversion, Hydroelectric Power, Fish
& Wildlife Habitat

Fish & Wildlife
Service

Fish & Wildlife
Study and
Coordination Act
Recommend
of 1956; National
Environmental
Policy Act;
Endangered Species
Act

Bonneville Power
Administration

Bonneville Project
Act

Physical Regulation Hydroelectric
Power

Coast Guard
13th Dsitrict

Federal Water
Pollution Control
Act of 1972
( P.L. 92-500);
and many others

Administrative
Regulation;
Enforcement

Navigation, Water
Quality

Environmental
Protection Agency
Region X

Federal Water
Pollution Control
Act of 1972
( P.L. 92-500)

Administrative
Regulation;
Enforcement

Water Quality

Department of
Health, Education
& Welfare

National Environmental Policy Act
[42 USCA 4332
(2) (c)]; P.L.
92-500

Study and
Recommend

Waste Dilution,
Hydroelectric
Power, Fish
Habitat

Pacific Northwest
River Basin
Commission

P.L. 89-80 ( 1965)

Coordination, Study, All Uses
and Recommend

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

STATE OF IDAHO
Department of
Water Resources

Idaho Code
42-173lff

Fish & Game
Dept. of Health
& Welfare

Study Administrative All
Regulation
Study and
Recommend

Idaho Code
39-l0Off

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

Study, Administrate, Water Quality
Regulation

STATE OF MONTANA
Dept. of Natural
Resources and
Conservation
( Conservation
Div.; Division of
Forestry; Water
Resources Division)

RCM 89-61.2;
89-865; 1973
Montana Water
Use Act; 1965
Fish Stream
Protection Act;
Floodway Management Act;
The Organic Act

Study &
Administrative
Regulation

All
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Nature of'
Authority

Substantive
Uses

Department of
State Lands

Study and
Recommend

Recreation &
Aesthetics

Department of
Agriculture

Study and
Recommend

Agricultural
Diversion; Return
Flows

Consult, Study &
Recommend

Flood Flow;
Stream Preservation;
Fish Habitat

Department of
Highways

See Dept. of
Natural Resources
& Conservation

Department of
Game & Fish

Senate Bill 444,
Study and
Fish & Wildlife
Chapter 452 ( 1973) Recommend; Adm. Habitat
Regulate; On Basis
of Permit to
Appropriate rec'd
from DNRC

Department of
Health & Environmental Sciences
Wat er Quality
Bureau

1947 Water
Pollution Control
Act ( Chap. 48)

Administrative
Regulation

Water Quality
Aesthetics

STATE OF OREGON
Administrative
Regulation

All

Wildlife Commission ORS 536.310

Study and
Recommend

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

State Engineers

Water Resources
Board

ORS 536.310

Enforcement of

All

Coastal Conservation ORS 191 & 140
& Development
Commission

Study and
Recommend

All

Fish Commission

ORS 509.306

Some Administration; Regulation;
Study and
Recommend

Anadromous &
Food Fish Habitat

Division of
State Lands

ORS 541.605-635

Adm. Regulation;
Study and
Recommend

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat; Gravel
Mining

Parks Division
ORS 390.805-925
( of Highway Dept.)

Consult; Study &
Recommend

Water Quality;
Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

Department of
Forestry

ORS 527.610-730;
527-990( 1)

Develop & Enforce
Forest Practice
Rules

All

Soil & Water
Conservation
Commission

ORS 568-550( c)

Study and
Recommend

Agricultural
Diversion

Health Division

ORS 448.215,
235, 265

Surveillance, Study
and Recommend

Water Quality

ORS 536.548 &
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Nature af
Authority

Substantive
Uses

Department of
Environmental
Quality (Water
Quality Control
Division & River
Basin Planning
Division)

ORS 340ff

Study and Admin.
Regulation

All with emphasis
on water quality

Port of Portland

State Charter

Administrative
Regulation

Navigation;
Water Quality

Public Utilities
Commission

Derived

Administrative
Regulation

Domestic Diversion

Department of
Ecology

RCW 90.54,
90.22

Administrative
Regulation

All

Department of
Game

RCW 90.54,
90.22

Study and
Recommend

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

Department of
Fisheries

RCW90.54,
75.20.050 &
90 .22

Study and
Recommend

Fish & Wildlife
Habitat

Department of
Commerce &
Economic
Development

RCW 80.50

Study and
Administrative
Regulation

Water Quality,
Waste Discharge
for Nuc. Power
Plants

Consult, Study

Flood Control,
Fish Passage

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Highways
Department,
Hydraulic Section
Department of
Natural Resources

Enabling Act

Study and
Recommend

All ( Trustee of
State Lands)

Oceanographic
Commission

Senate Bill 49
( Chap . 243) 1967

Coordinate, Study

Estuarine Uses

Interagency
Committee for
Outdoor Recreation

RCW 43.99
( As Amended)

Coordinate, Plan

Recreation,
Aesthetics, Fish
& Wildlife Habitat

Parks & Recreation
Commission

Derived from
DOE & Dept. of
Social & Health
Services

Study, Some
Administrative
Regulation

Recreation Waste
Dilution

Thermal Power
Plant Site
Evaluation Council

RCW 80.50

Study and
Recommend

Thermal Pollution
and all others
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in part, on a questionnaire which was sent to all agencies in the Pacific
Northwest which the investigators believed would have at least marginal
involvement in instream-flow needs determinations, and in part, on a
series of interviews and workshops with agency personnel.
THE INSTREAM FLOW ARENA
An arena may be thought of as any sphere of interests or activity. It
is derived from the notion of an amphitheater in which the actors are
confined to a specific space. The instream flow decision-making arena
is similarly constrained. Within the general context of water allocation
in the Pacific Northwest, there are identillable actors, issues, and activities
which are peculiar to the establishment and maintenance of instreamflow levels. Moreover, these activities take place within the boundaries
provided by statute, legal precedent, and tradition.
The same water cannot be used in the stream and diverted as well.
Even though there may be return flows to the stream from diversions
for irrigation , for example, the water is returned in a condition of lower
quality and lower quantity. Moreover, the water is returned downstream
of the diversion and sometimes to a different watershed. It is clear that
diversionary and instream uses are in competition with each other.
There is also competition among instream uses. Hydroelectric power
production , for example, is an instream use which requires impoundments
of water which adversely affect anadromous fish life and natural aesthetics, and may alter recreation potential. When one considers instream requirements for water quality and navigation, the result is seen as a
complex set of problems requiring a delicate balance of trade-offs, and
extensive information on the various instrearn needs. To illustrate,
pooling for hydropower results in an alteration of water temperature
downstream from the impoundment. This may, as in the case of Oregon's
Rogue River, improve the trout fishery and reduce the attractiveness of
the stream for swimming and white-water boating. The impoundment
itself changes the nature of recreation on the stream , and the peaking
flows needed for power production may cause the stream to fluctuate
thousands of cubic feet per second within a short time. This fluctuation
makes anadromous fish migration difficult, adversely affects commercial
fishing and other interests, and may render recreational activities severely
hazardous.
One major additional source of competition in the Pacific Northwest
is the potential for out-of-basin diversion. The most famous longstanding out-of-region demand on the Columbia River System is for diversion
to the arid Southwest While southern California and Arizona may have
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adequate water supplies at the present, increasing demand coupled with
a reduction in supply in the Southwest may increase pressures on the
resources of the Pacillc Northwest.
All of this competition among the various uses of water is basic to
the problem of establishing instream-flow levels. The intrinsic element
of competition among various uses of water is reflected in the development of water law and in the growth of agencies charged with administering water-related values. Among many others , Charles Sheldon
has noted that problems in law are a reflection of controversies in the
society at large. 1 This is certainly the case with law regarding the allocation of water rights. The nature of competition for water, and the
emerging body of law favoring instream water rights , set the stage on
which water resource agencies will enact a drama which both reflects,
and impacts , the water resources controversies in the society at large.
INTERAGENCY BARGAINING AND AGENCY POWER
The multitude of agencies with some responsibility for determining
instream flow needs clearly are not equal to their ability to achieve their
own objectives. Any instream-flow level established by a single agency for
its own mission-oriented use will impinge to some extent upon the water
uses promoted by other agencies. The outcome of public policy, that is,
the specillc decisions regarding instream-flow reservations, will be subject
to the relative agency power ( ability to achieve agency objectives) of
the several agencies in the decision arena. Interagency bargaining is an
important mode of decision making in this arena of uncertainty caused
by changing laws and public opinion , but the tools for bargaining are
distributed unequally among the agencies.
There are several determinants of agency power relative to other
agencies which relate to the potential outcome of instream-flow policy.
Each is enumerated in tum with suggestions of its potential impact.

Statutory Responsibility
There are substantial differences in the statutory responsibility held
by agencies for instream-flow needs. At the federal level, no single
agency has statutory authority to be the sole federal agency responsible
for setting instream-flow levels and to enforc e those levels on other
federal and state agencies. At the same level, statutory responsibility in
Idaho is an administrative "policy" which identifies instr eam-flow needs
as beneficial uses of water, but which lacks constitutional authority. The
administrative policy bas recently been tested in court , but no single
1 "Introduction," in Charles H. Sheldon, Ed., The Supreme Court: Politicians
in Robes ( Beverly Hills, California: Glencoe Press, 1970), p. ix .
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agency in Idaho has statutory responsibility to set minimum flows. In
Washington, the state legislature has designated instream flow as a
beneficial use, and requires the State Department of Ecology to establish
minimum-flow levels for streams within the state. Statutes in Oregon
and Montana fall between these two extremes.
In general, the stronger the statutory mandate for involvement in
mstream flow needs, the greater will be the power of the agency and the
more intense will be its involvement, other things being equal. Of
course, the other things seldom are equal and their impact on agency
power is noted below.
In the study, we identified three types or levels of activity based on
statutory authority. One type is formal or informal consultation with
other agencies regarding waterflow requirements. This level of activity
normally does not require specific statutory authority, but can relate
to an agency's overall mission. Involvement at this level may not require a methodology for determining instream-flow needs, but may be
based on preferences and agency values.
The second type, or level, of activity-Study and recommendation of
appropriate waterflow requirements-carries
with it a greater degree
of relative power than formal or informal consultation. At this level,
some kind of instream-flow needs methodology is appropriate. Acquisition
of data also is implicit in the definition. It can safely be assumed that
agencies operating at this level will study and recommend appropriate
waterflow requirements in terms of their own mission. For example, a
Detpartment of Fisheries would be interested in recommending waterflow
requirements for £sh habitat, without regard to instream flow needs for
other uses.
The highest level of agency activity is the administrative regulation
of waterflow requirements. The statutory authority for this level of activity may be either speci£c or derived from a more general regulatory
authorization.
Table 2 shows those agencies which frequently are involved in each
of the three types of instream-flow activity. One immediate observation
is that a greater number of agencies are involved at the lower levels of
activity and fewer agencies are involved when the level of activity approaches administrative regulation. The nature of responses differs by
instream use, but the trend is toward reduced frequency of involvement
as the intensity of activity increases.
Table 3 shows that the frequency of involvement is a function of the
particular instream use in question. For example, approximately 38% of
the agencies indicate frequent involvement in consultation with other

:t

._

TABLE 2

I

Percentage of Agencies Frequently Involved in
Instream Uses, by Level of Activity
Level of Activity

Navigation

Consultation With Other Agencies
. .. ... 37.7%
Study and Recommendation of
Appropriate Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.9%
Administrative Regulation of Flows . . . . . . . . 10.4%

..,
0

Waste
Dilution

HydroPower

Fish
Habitat

Wildlife
Habitat

50.7%

45.5%

76.6%

66.3%

75.4%

67.6%

7.8%

41.6%
22.1%

31.2%
23.4%

66.3%
33.8%

58.5%
26.0%

65.0%
24.7%

53.2%
20.8%

6.5%
0%
en

Recreation

Aesthetics

Other

o"'O

§
~

i
~
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TABLE 3

Percentage of Agencies Which Frequently Consult With
Other Agencies on Instream Uses
% of
Type of Instream Use
Navigation . . .
. ..... .. .... .
........
Waste Dilution ............
. ..........
.
Hydropower .... .. . .... .... .. .. . ...... . ...... .
Fish Habitat
.... . ... .. . .. ...................
...
Wildlife Habitat
............
. .......
.. .. .
Recreation .... .... ... . .... . ..........
..
Aesthetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Agencies
37.7
50.7
45.5
76.6
66.3
75.4
67.6

agencies regarding navigation. Given the nature of the use, and the
relatively fewer agencies with statutory responsibility for navigation, it
is not surprising to find that few agencies are involved in this particular
use. Instream flow for fish habitat, by contrast, is an area in which
76.6% of the agencies repmted frequent involvement at the level of
consultation and nearly 34% at the level of administrative regulation.
This may, of course, be a function of the requirement that environmental
impact statements be prepared for proposed projects. Another possible
interpretation is that the legal and political atmosphere among water
resource agencies requires that they take some of the emerging instream
uses into account in their planning programs. The fact that so many
agencies do recognize some statutory responsibility for these uses suggests that they will be potentially considered in water planning and
development activities.

Ability to Physically Control Stream Flows
Some agencies, such as the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation , and the Bonneville Power Administration are in a position to
physically regulate the stream flows by the use of dams. This ability
to physically regulate the stream places these agencies in an enviable
position with regard to their ability to establish and enforce instream
flow levels consistent with their own missions . By contrast, agencies
such as Fish and Game Departments may have an intense interest for
setting flow levels for fish, but these agencies must depend upon adequate runoff or favorable bargaining with the agencies which administer
dams. Agencies controlling regulating facilities more easily can have the
final say on regulated streams. They attempt to cooperate with agencie s
responsible for other instream-flow uses, but also must heed first their
statutory mandate to pursue a particular mission.
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With regard to the emerging instream uses, the agencies with the
ability to physically control streamflows have not historically had a good
track record for adequately considering fish, wildlif e, recreation, and
aesthetic values. Economic considerations , through cost/benefit analysis,
along with considerations of political feasibility, typically have been
the overriding criteria under which proj ects were justified. Fish and
wildlife agencies have historically been in a weak bargaining position in
recommending Hows to be maintained below dams.
Given our experience with the past , and the generaliz ed tendency for
bureaucracies to develop new values slowly or not at all, development
philosophies antagonistic to fish and wildlife, recreation and aesthetics
may be expected to continue. Public opinion , reflected in the recent
"environmental movement" and embodied in the National Environmental
Policy Act may render the bargaining power of fish and wildlife and
recreation agencies more substantial vis-a-vis construction agencies. One
disconcerting note in the study was that power and flood control agencies
-those typically in the construction business-tend to have very limited
contacts with other agencies and reported consulting primarily with
each other. To the extent that this is a general occurrence, agencies
representing fish and wildlife, recreation and aesthetic values can anticipate little input into the water development planning process.

Agency Mission
lnstream How needs are central to the mission of some agencies. For
example, agencies dealing with fisheries and navigation are keenly interested in instream Hows. The extent to which instream How is central
to the agency mission seems to be an important determinant of intensity
of involvement. Some agencies , such as the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Bureau of Reclamation , tend to be less directly involved
in instream-flow needs in general , but for specific issues which directly
impinge upon their missions, they may become intensely involved.
High level of involvement may help to insure that a particular agency's
goals be considered , if not adopted ( Squeaky Wheel Proverb).
Designation as Implementing Agency
Some states have designated a single agency as having the responsibility for setting and implementing flow levels for all uses. In such cases,
this central agency becomes a broker and must decide on flow levels on
the basis of a variety of sourc es, including any instream-flow uses promoted by the central agency itself. The agency thus has an advantage
over other agencies, but is subject to many political pressures to which
it must respond.
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As a corollary to this, agencies with responsibility to grant water
rights possess an important tool preserving instream flows through nonappropriation. In the State of Washington, this tool has been used with
some measure of success by the Department of Ecology. The Department
has simply withdrawn certain streams from further appropriation. Partly
because of statutes, and partly because of tradition, some states by
conh·ast are oriented to granting water rights permits up to ( and in some
cases exceeding) full appropriation. Regardless of how the potential
tool of non-appropriation has been used historically, the statutory authority to control water rights places certain agencies in a better position
to implement and enforce instream-flow levels, or to prevent the implementation and enforcement of such flows.
For the federal agencies, this determinant of power does not apply.
Each federal agency operates within the general bounds of its own
mission and statutory responsibilities, but no single federal agency has
the authority to act as broker for the others in the arena of instream flows.

Land Ownership
Public land managers, such as the Forest Service, seem to be much
more able to deal with instream-flow needs than agencies which do not
own large tracts of land. In addition to its land ownership, the Forest
Service has statutory responsibility to determine the water requirements
within national forest boundaries. The combination of these two factors
enables the Forest Service to make decisions which can impinge on
other water management agencies downstream ( both the state and
federal) but without some of the interagency conflicts which normally
would occur.
In the future, we expect that land ownership by federal agencies will
become increasingly important as a determinant of agency power as the
legal aspects of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine unfold. Combined
with the Federal Reserved Rights, any successful attempts in the future
to require quantification of federal agency water requirements may substantially impact the extent of reservation for instream uses.
Methodological Sophistication for Data Acquisition
There are striking diHerences between agencies with regard to their
ability to produce data supportive of their instream-flow needs. For
example, flow needs and incremental impacts for power production and
navigation can be determined with relative accuracy, in contrast to
flow needs for water-based recreation or fish spawning.
In a survey of all agencies, the fish and wildlife, recreation/ aesthetic,
and land management agencies most frequently recommend data de-
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velopment for improved instream-flow decisions. Because the emerging
instream uses have not enjoyed statutory support over a long period of
time, the need for data to justify decisions is particularly acute. By
contrast, the power and flood control agencies surveyed were far less
likely to recommend data development for improved stream-flow decisions.

Public Support
Agencies enjoy variable levels of public support for their m1ss1on.
To the extent that an agency has strong public backing for its goals
and objectives, the agency will have greater ability to enforce instreamflow levels consistent with its mission. This factor accounts for the substantial public support enjoyed by many state water rights agencies in
fully appropriating water to beneficial uses. For example, in the Pacific
Northwest over the past century, water appropriation for irrigation has
been strongly supported by the vocal and powerful agriculture-related
groups.
Favorable to the emerging instream-flow uses is the recent "environmental movement" in which public attention has been brought to bear
by public interest groups antagonistic to the prevailing values of the
past. To the extent that public concern over the environment continues,
fish and wildlife and recreation agencies will enjoy strengthened bargaining positions. Such support may be bolstered through such mechanisms
as the "principles and standards" promulgated by the Water Resources
Council. These mechanisms simply reflect through adminish·ative and
legislative channels public concerns expressed in the environmental movement.
Economic Importance
Those water uses which have a widely recognized economic importance enable their "advocate agencies" to enjoy greater confidence pursuing their goals. For example, power or irrigation development agencies
are in a much more favorable position than agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Fish and Wildlife Service, whose water
use demands may be antagonistic to, or at least neutral with regard to,
traditional economic development.
Agency Resources
In general, those agencies with large operating budgets and personnel seem to be more able to compete in the arena of setting and
enforcing instream flows than agencies with lesser resources. In large
measure , the relative agency resources reflects public and political support of an agency as expressed through the budgetary process.
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BETWEEN FACTORS

One way of conceptualizing the interaction among the several determinants of power is illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, relative
agency power is expressed as a function of an agency's administrative
regulatory authority, physical regulatory ability, and intensity of interest
( a function of agency mission). To the extent that a particular agency
possesses regulatory capabilities and is intense in pursuance of its objectives, it possesses power vis-a-vis other agencies. For example, the
Corps of Engineers would fall in the cell represented by yes-active/
yes-active. That agency is powerful because it has administrative authority, physical capability, and is actively interested in both. This multidimensional framework could be broadened to include the other determinants of power as well. According to this framework, the various
determinants are additive, although in actual practice some are more
important than others.
Administrative Regulatory Authority
YES

NO

Intensity of Interest

Intensity of Interest

Active

c

Active

a

~
p..

Passive

4

Active

Passive

3

YES

Cl!

C)

Passive

~

1

2

0

~

1c

Active

Q.)

3

2

,::i:;

..... NO

ti!
CJ

"'
>.

Passive

~

~

1

0

Agency Power as a Function of an Administrative Regulatory Authority,
Physical Regulatory Capability, and Agency Interest.
NO'rE: The numbers in each cell indicate relative power. Higher numbers indicate
greater ability of an agency to achieve its own objectives vis-a-vis agencies.
Some cells are left empty in this conceptualization to indicate the very low
likelihood that any agency could be found to fit the category.
FIGURE

1.
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SUMMARY

In summary, public agencies involved in instream-How needs in the
West are clearly not on equal footing with regard to enforcing their
own missions. There are a variety of factors which enable some agencies
to exercise greather authority than others. In a given situation, the combination of these "interagency power" factors appears to be an important
determinant of the instream-How policies which are eventually adopte d
and implemented.
As in many other aspects of water use and development, decisions
are made in an atmosphere of conflict and bargaining. There is no
single, comprehensive, unified process for making water-allocation decisions. For the many interest groups advocating various water uses, there
are parallel public agencies espousing the same goals. The outcome of
the current struggle is impossible to predict.
The situation is one in which certain instream uses, particularly fish
and wildlife, recreation and aesthetics, have not traditionally been
afforded legal protection. In the recent past, there have been several
developments in water laws which offered to these uses a greater degree
of protection than previously had existed. The legal situation is constantly changing and legal doctrines in this arena continue to emerge.
Yet, even where some states currently are providing by state statute
or administrative policy some protection for instream values, these rights
are inferior to those of the long-held, traditional-use, diversionary rights.
Increasing protection of instream uses through law is only part of the
battle. The degree to which environmental values afforded by instream
Hows are to be protected effectively will be determined to a substantial
extent by the strength with which the advocate agencies pursue their
goals. In the interagency arena of conflict over water resources, the
agencies espousing instream Hows for fish and wildlife, recreation, and
aesthetics are not overly blessed with determinants of power. Selective
use of power in priority situations may enable these agencies to take
positive strides toward the protection of the natural environment.

